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Abstract 1  — Scientific investigation procedures have been 
evolving to follow an ever-changing cultural landscape, the 
sophistication of the technology available and an ever-growing 
knowledge base. This continuous evolution brought investigation 
practices through distinct historical phases, mostly marked by 
different types of participants and organization, from individual 
natural philosophers to science driven by large institutions. 
There is clear evidence that we are now getting to an age of 
drastic disruptive change. Increased complexity and mandatory 
multidisciplinary thinking have moved research from an initial 
phase of disjoint polymaths into a current phase of widespread 
uncontrolled use of computational tools and data generation, the 
“informatics crisis”. The use of advanced computational 
technology for communication and generation of data in large 
scale without proper controls is compromising our ability to 
conduct an adequate reproducible investigation, causing a 
dangerous drift from the scientific method. The same technology 
that could potentially control and automate the production and 
analysis of results is undermining the principles of the scientific 
method. 
To counteract this deviation, we advocate the use of a next-
generation investigative approach leveraging forces of human 
diversity, micro-specialized crowds and proper computer-
assisted control methods associated with a “pipeline of proof”.  
This paper outlines the impact of advanced computational 
technology, not only as an accelerator of the rate in which 
humanity acquires objective knowledge but also as a dangerous 
side effect as a generator of massive amounts of uncontrolled, 
unverified and untraceable data and results that cannot be 
reproduced.  
We propose an alternative for methods of investigation based 
on collaboration in large-scale through standard procedures of 
proof and crowds in building a “collective brain in which 
neurons are human collaborators”.  
I. SCIENTIFIC LEARNING AND ECONOMICS 
Humans learn new things through investigation. Careful 
investigation is what establishes if an observed phenomenon is 
real, or it should be deemed just a result of random forces of 
nature at play. The primary target of any investigation is to 
establish facts, as accurately as possible, by proving 
observations to be either true or false. That is how humankind 
has been accumulating objective knowledge for as long as we 
walk this earth, and this is why defining precise methods of 
proof is crucial. 
                                                
1 Large portions of this paper are reproduced as part of [21] 
However, the mental process we follow as individuals to 
investigate and learn about things is not straightforward. Even 
at this present date, science is still not able to unequivocally 
explain the process by which we learn and assess things. If 
this is true when we produce our thoughts on our own, we 
should expect an even more elaborate process to be at play 
when we introduce procedures of investigation that are 
performed by multiple individuals, organized in seemingly 
chaotic crowds. 
The process of learning and understanding followed by 
humans is abstract, fluid and subject to multiple definitions of 
what one might consider knowledge, assumptions, and beliefs. 
Given this abstract nature, it is essential to identify what is 
objective knowledge, or what is known, from what is not. 
Alternatively, in other words, demarcate the difference 
between what is considered science from what is not.  
The clear demarcation of what is considered science, and 
what is not, is part of a controversial issue usually referred to 
as a demarcation problem [1]. In a scenario where the intent is 
to produce new knowledge from a pre-existent foundation of 
knowledge by using large crowds of participants in scientific 
investigation, it becomes even more critical establish clear 
criteria for demarcation and for separation of what is known 
from everything else. This process of building new knowledge 
from a pre-existing foundation of what is considered to be true 
is called scientific learning. Scientific learning occurs as a 
result of two specific requirements. 
The first requirement is that by definition scientific learning 
occurs by the application of the principles of the scientific 
method. These principles show that, despite its power, science 
is indeed a simple tool. In science, we rule out things 
considered false based on hard evidence. What is true 
(truthfulness) is then inferred by exclusion2 [2] [3] [4]. We 
refer to this process of inference as the modern scientific 
method, outlined by a set of six principles [5]: 
• The goal of scientific investigation should be to gain 
objective knowledge [6].  
• Scientific knowledge is obtained through tests, 
experiments and observations. Tentative assumptions 
                                                
2 Discounting the recent resurgence of the truth-conducive controversy, in 
which “it is fashionable among (…) some philosophers to say there are no 
principles of rationality that are truth-conducive (…) since there are no 
standards of rationality, there is no logic or method to science” [111]. 
about a particular phenomenon may, however, be 
deduced from pre-existing knowledge. 
• A hypothesis must be verifiable by some experimental 
or observational method. 
• Experiments must be reproducible and must have 
controls 
• The integrity of the data must be appropriately 
safeguarded.  
In the modern scientific method, “each principle helps to 
increase the reliability and accuracy of knowledge resulting 
from scientific research” [5]. By that definition, these 
principles naturally address the requirements for objective 
scientific learning in economics described previously.  
The second requirement is that scientific learning is 
dependent on peculiar characteristics in a field of study. 
Economics and financial sciences3 are particular domains of 
knowledge in which related systems and agents – markets, 
humans and their relationships – are hard, if not impossible, to 
model. For appropriate investigative procedures, adequate 
financial models must be able to deal with this intrinsic 
complexity of economic systems and agents [7] [8] [9]. As 
such, economics should not be treated differently from other 
disciplines considered hard sciences 4 5 . In the field of 
economics the process by which knowledge is acquired is 
defined, and dependent, on three specific peculiarities of the 
subject of study: 
• Complexity: modern economics deals with a unique 
subject of study - a shared, intertwined, complex market 
– that cannot be rewound. Time like life moves towards 
one direction [10]. Given the usually large number of 
inputs to such a complex system and the apparent 
independence between these input variables, once an 
event occurs, we cannot derive different futures from 
what the present currently describes [6]. 
• Lack of proper theoretical models: when taken from a 
recent historical perspective modern economics has 
been associated with compartmented classical fields like 
psychology, statistics, sociology, and computer sciences.  
Most of the assumptions in classical and theoretical 
sciences are inherently oversimplified and flawed when 
trying to predict or understand the behavior of a 
systemic market6 [10] [6].  
• Multidisciplinary fields of study: modern economics 
is, in essence, a multidisciplinary subject. Efforts to 
                                                
3 In the context of this document the terms “financial sciences” and 
“economics” have interchangeable connotations. 
4 We use the term “hard sciences” as it was coined by Nobel Prize winner in 
Economics in 1978 Herbert Simon, “for his pioneering research into the 
decision-making process within economic organizations", on his words: “The 
social sciences, I thought, needed the same kind of rigor and the same 
mathematical underpinnings that had made the ‘hard’ sciences so brilliantly 
successful” (Simon 1978) 
5 We incorporate the colloquial definition of “hard” and “soft” sciences to 
respectively discern between natural sciences (e.g., biology, chemistry, and 
physics) and social sciences (e.g., economics, psychology, sociology) based 
on “evidence of a hierarchy of sciences” (Fanelli and Glanzel 2013). 
6 While we consider important to highlight this peculiarity, evaluating reasons 
for such limitations, or trying to entirely refute or confirm them is beyond the 
scope of this research 
understand the market considering its most fundamental 
structures tend to rely on somewhat orthogonal fields of 
study like neuroeconomics [11], behavioral sciences 
[12], and analysis of market micro-events [13], among 
others. The interdependency of subjects in economics to 
bioengineering, neurosciences, social sciences, 
psychology, data and computer sciences, and related 
fields is diffuse and difficult to correlate and at the same 
time, critical for scientific learning [6].  
As a consequence of these peculiarities of our field of study 
(i.e., systemic complexity, lack of proper theoretical models, 
and novelty of correlated fields of study) modern research in 
economics becomes strictly dependent on high-performance 
computers 7 , requiring the implementation of elaborate 
simulation-based techniques. Similar to what is used in other 
hard-sciences, such as physics, engineering, and biophysics 
[14] [15] [6]. This dependency on high-performance 
computing has driven research in economics to favor 
specialized techniques for storage and processing speed. The 
field has been shaped so that the sheer generation of data and 
obscure ways to represent computational procedures is 
prioritized over proper control.  
To offset these limitations, this paper advocates the use of 
crowds for the investigation and resolution of complex 
problems in general and in economics in particular, an 
approach we are calling crowd-based investigation.  
II. CROWD-BASED SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION AND A 
PIPELINE OF PROOF 
Given the number of participants and the nature of the 
interaction – formal scientific investigation - we can safely 
expect as a consequence a large number of hypotheses being 
generated and tested. On this scenario, ideas must be defined, 
exchanged, discussed, and tested in a sequence of steps, 
arranged like a pipeline. Procedures in each step of the 
pipeline should potentially generate massive amounts of data, 
and each piece of data should be unquestionably tested as true 
or false. As a consequence, each of the steps must abide by 
transparency standards and validation metrics that must be 
well understood and accepted by all participants. 
In this section, we define requisites and the composition of 
this process and steps involved, what we call a proof pipeline. 
A proof pipeline for scientific investigation is proposed as a 
process, composed of individual tasks, each task producing 
standard outputs that can be used to prove or reject an 
observation.  
A simplistic description of such a pipeline would be a tube, 
where its input, taken on the head of the pipe, is a problem, or 
a set of ideas under investigation, and other intangible aspects 
such as the experience of the individual performing the 
inquiry or the investigation. On the tail of the tube, the result 
of the investigation, as either true or false. Over the extension 
of the tube, there are small holes, from where the process 
                                                
7 A correlated consequence is that an ever-increasing dependency on high 
performance computers for scientific investigation makes it difficult to 
differentiate between subjects that are specific to economics, financial 
sciences, or computational finance.  In other words, there is an incentive and a 
justification for economics, financial sciences, and computational finance to 
have a significant overlap. 
produces pre-defined, controlled data as evidence. A diagram 
of a proof pipeline is shown later in this thesis, in Figure 1, on 
page 4. 
The idea of arranging a sequence of pre-defined steps to 
assert a result of an investigation as true or false is not new. 
There are references in the literature to a step-by-step process 
in biomedical research, specifically for statistical 
measurements, referred to as a “statistical pipeline” [16] [17]. 
Although similar in its overreaching purpose and the intended 
standardization of the understanding of what is true or false, 
the scope of what that pipeline would entail is different than 
what this paper proposes. Their scope is also limited 
specifically to software patterns and a computational platform. 
Specifically, in the field of economics, there are proposals in 
the literature with minor overlapping with the idea of proof 
pipelines, arranging economic models as testable pieces of 
engineering, not necessarily as pipelines, referred to as 
“economic wind tunnels” [14]. 
As described earlier, a proof pipeline is a process, and as it 
is usually the case with processes, each step or part is 
composed of smaller mechanisms, smaller gears. Some gears 
are familiar and well understood, others not so much. One of 
those gears, required to establish a proof pipeline, is the 
underlying mechanism by which we get to conclusions based 
on premises taken from specific outcomes of an investigation. 
This process of getting to conclusions based on premises is 
called inference8. An inference is a mechanism we use to 
evaluate, learn, and create. This intricate mechanism is 
responsible for some of the most fundamental structures of the 
scientific thought. 
The mechanism of inference is a complex and abstract 
subject, and for its very nature, it is difficult to explain. 
Human ingenuity is attracted to things that can’t be easily 
explained, so scientists have been looking at the general 
subject of inference for a long time, trying to understand and 
explain the specifics through studies in philosophy, 
biomedicine, and even religion. This lengthy inquiry is far 
from over. Formalizations of the exact mechanisms at play are 
mostly abstract, and as it is usually the case with philosophical 
subjects, surrounded by controversy [18] [19].  
For this reason, in this paper, we want to carefully, and 
intentionally, stay away from the argument. While we 
understand the importance of the debate and study of general 
concepts around the topic called “philosophy of science” [20], 
each of the small topics under the subject could lend a lengthy 
separate study in itself. Would be impractical and redundant to 
explore in this paper all the open controversies, different 
viewpoints, intricate details, and differences between methods 
[21].  
                                                
8 In this paper the term inference, used without qualifications, refers 
specifically to human inference and is defined as “the act of passing from 
one’s proposition, statement, or judgment, considered as true, to another 
whose truth is believed to follow from that of the former” (Merriam-Webster 
2018). Inference performed by humans and machines are related to different 
mechanisms and should not be used interchangeably (Gellatly 1989). It also 
differs for the term statistical inference, or quantitative inference, also used in 
this paper, defined as “the act of passing from statistical sample data to 
generalizations usually with calculated degrees of certainty” (Merriam-
Webster 2018). 
Hence, it is essential at this point to carefully define our 
scope of interest when it comes to the general topic of 
inference and a proof pipeline, namely four specific topics: 
• Support for falsifiable and testable inquiry: the 
demarcation of what should be considered scientific is 
given by investigation propositions formalized by 
statements that can be tested and falsified. A scientific 
statement should be capable of conflicting with possible 
or conceivable observations, in line with the principle of 
falsifiability, in which “statements or systems of 
statements, in order to be ranked as scientific, must be 
capable of conflicting with possible, or conceivable 
observations” [22] 
• Step-wise, algorithmic nature: methods of inference 
should fit a general algorithmic structure and a step-by-
step, procedural description, mimicking the sequential 
arrangement of a pipeline. 
• Participation and collaboration in large-scale: 
investigation should incentivize collaboration and 
interaction of a large number of participants. Features or 
metrics of inference should be well understood and 
serve as a quantifiable standard for what to be 
considered true or false.  
• Computer augmented: computers should serve as 
control points for collaboration and interaction of 
human participants, and not as agents of scientific 
inquiry themselves. 
Given the scope of inference and these topics, the most 
commonly accepted model of inference describing the 
scientific inquiry based on testing and falsifiability is the 
Hypothetico-Deductive model, or H-D model [23]. The H-D 
model is a composition of all known modes of reasoning [24] 
[25] [26]. In this sense, reasoning is defined as the act of 
associating premises to conclusions and is described through 
three distinct modes of reasoning: deductive, inductive, and 
abductive. These modes of reasoning are considered the core 
of Karl Popper’s falsifiability and testability argument of any 
scientific hypothesis [27].  
Popper’s surprisingly simple theory proposes discovery to 
occur in two steps. On the first step – conjecture9 – a scientist 
offers a hypothesis that might explain some natural 
phenomena. The second step – refutation – the hypothesis is 
tested in order to show that the hypothesis is false [22]. If we 
succeed to show that the original conjecture is false, we go 
back to the first step, build a new conjecture, and follow the 
two-step process again. If in the second step we fail to test the 
hypothesis as false we should assume that the original 
conjecture is – for the moment, and as far as we could not 
prove otherwise – correct [20].  
Popper’s theory is fundamental to the definition of the 
proof pipeline proposed in this section through a variation of 
the H-D model, and application of all modes of reasoning. The 
exact formulation of the H-D model vary, but in most cases, it 
is a combination of Karl Popper’s view of falsifiability and 
                                                
9 A conjecture is not materialized as a specific contribution. As a consequence, 
multiple experts can express the same semantic, and therefore one conjecture 
can possibly be reflected in different models.  
testing, and a less skeptical view about confirmation10 [20]. A 
less skeptical view, in this case, means that our reliance on the 
notion that evidence can affect the credibility of a hypothesis 
is necessarily fallible11 [28]. 
The essence of the idea behind the hypothetic-deductivism 
in science is old, with its origins in Plato’s dialogues, referred 
to in that work as “the method of hypotheses” [23]. In a 
broader sense, the H-D model relies on a proposition of a 
hypothesis in a way that it can be falsified by a test of this 
proposition against observations, or evidence. The H-D model 
represents a formalization of the scientific method through a 
set of a simple sequence of four steps: observe; form a 
conjecture; deduce predictions from a conjecture; and test the 
predictions [20]. 
Additionally, the H-D model formalizes a process of 
investigation through individual, sequential steps. The 
formalization of a process of investigation through a pre-
defined sequence of steps defines the process of discovery as 
inherently algorithmic [29]. The idea of algorithmic 
procedures of investigation is not new. A precursor of the 
modern scientific method, Francis Bacon, arguably a 
predecessor of Karl Popper in respect of the method of 
falsification [30] had foreseen two critical interconnected 
insights that are relevant to this research: 
• The step-by-step, methodical approach to investigation, 
where Bacon used the word “machine” to describe his 
method in Novum Organum in 1620 [29] [30] [31].  
• Bacon’s method intended to leverage a “community of 
observers to collect vast amounts of information” and 
tabulate it into a central repository accessible to all [29], 
what would be equivalent to the notion of a what today 
we call a crowd in XVII century parlance.  
Following through on Bacon’s hint, if discovery is 
algorithmic, then we can safely assume that machines could 
perform it. Alternatively, better yet, as this paper advocates, 
discovery can be performed in large scale, having machines 
orchestrate the steps and rules of the collaboration of human 
crowds. 
The application of this H-D model as an algorithm to a 
framework supporting crowd-based investigation can be 
described through a set of specific steps [20]: 
• Observe. The observer should use personal experience 
to understand and appreciate the problem under study. 
Gather previous contributions12 relevant to the case of 
use at hand.  
                                                
10 Confirmation refers to “the problem of understanding when observations 
can confirm a scientific theory”, and what is required in order to have an 
“observation evidence for the theory”. This is a complex philosophical 
problem, often referred to as “the mother of all problems” [20].  
11 Observations cannot confirm theories or conclusions, i.e., “even with 
extensive and truthful evidence available, drawing a mistaken conclusion is 
more than a mere possibility”, and as a consequence “under usual 
circumstances, reasoning from evidence is necessarily fallible” (Crupi 2016) 
12 For now, the term “contribution” here is used in the same sense as when 
authors “contribute” to Wikipedia. A more detailed formalization of 
contributions is done in separate publication [21] [114]. 
• Form a conjecture or hypothesis 13 . Form a 
supposition, or a proposed explanation for the 
phenomena under observation, based on whatever 
limited evidence has been currently gathered as a 
starting point for further investigation. State an 
explanation of the hypothesis. Materialize that 
conjecture as a model. Share that model. 
• Deduce predictions from the conjecture. Formalize 
predictions, stating what should be expected if the 
conjecture is true. Incorporate those predictions as part 
of the model. 
• Test. Experiment with the model, looking for evidence 
(observations) that might disprove the predictions. 
Record all evidence as contributions and share those 
contributions. If predictions are disproved, so is the 
hypothesis: go back to step 2 and repeat. 
This sequence of steps in a pipeline of proof is depicted in 
Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Method of Proof in Crowd-Based Investigation 
A method of proof for collaboration in large-scale applying variations of the 
Hypothetico-Deductive Model to handle shared procedures of investigation in 
each of the phases: observe, conjecture, predict, and experiment. 
This paper advocates the use of this process, created from 
features of the H-D model, as a baseline for a proof pipeline 
for a crowd-based investigation and validation through the 
exchange of shared evidence.  
A Observation 
The first step of a proof pipeline deals with human 
observations. Observations are organoleptic and by definition 
are subject to abstract human interpretation. Given its 
subjective nature, it would be hard, if not impossible, to use 
machines to automate the process by which we generate high 
quality, reliable observation records. On the other hand, 
machines should be ideal to establish a platform for 
                                                
13 Literature refers to the specific step in the H-D model where a supposition 
or specific explanation is made as a conjecture, which is equivalent to the 
most commonly known term hypothesis. For fairness, and accuracy, this paper 
refers to both terms interchangeably. 
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collaboration in large-scale where observations can be 
recorded and shared. 
The idea of collecting observations in large-scale is not new. 
In Novum Organum, in 1620, Francis Bacon proposed a 
method intended to leverage a “community of observers to 
collect vast amounts of information” and tabulate them into a 
central repository accessible to all [29]. Currently, modern 
technology allows that vision of a central registry of 
contributions that can be shared and evaluated by a 
community of observers.  
B Conjecture 
The second step of the proof pipeline is the generation of 
conjectures, or hypotheses, to attempt to explain the cause of 
phenomena under observation. Hypotheses must be falsifiable, 
and at the same time, by definition cannot be entirely and 
irrefutably confirmed. It should always be assumed that 
improved research methods should disprove a hypothesis at a 
later date.  
Assuming an algorithmic nature of the discovery process, 
in what is commonly called automated hypothesis generation, 
hypotheses have a potential to be entirely generated by 
computers14 [32]. Automated hypothesis generation is still in 
initial stages, but research has produced a significant number 
of exceptional use cases. 
Starting in the 1980’s some experiments were able to 
hypothesize links between cause and effect, in two initially 
unrelated fields of study, without specialized knowledge in 
any of the subjects of study, and without conducting any 
experiments. The links were established by merely following 
algorithmic steps while connecting scientific papers with no 
citation overlaps [33]. More recent research allows for limited 
automated hypothesis generation based on large-scale text 
mining of academic publications, natural language processing, 
mathematical modeling, and graph theory. Some equally 
relevant and related features, taken out of the techniques in 
use in hypothesis generation, include the prediction of a 
successful academic career based on the writing style of 
scientists on entry-level positions and quantifiable metrics of 
efficiency in scientific discovery [34] [35] [36] [37] [32].  
However, despite the evidence of potential progress and the 
slow advancement, science still lacks a complete theory for 
fully automated hypothesis generation. Additionally, these 
techniques currently rely on volumes of quality data 
associated with scientific publications, a scarce resource now 
that major scientific journals have placed severe restrictions 
on text mining of their content [38].  
Instead of a fully automated hypothesis generation, this 
paper advocates the use of highly interconnected crowds 
orchestrated by computers. In such an environment, individual 
participants in a crowd would rely on computers to perform 
specialized discovery tasks, communication, and to produce 
metrics of quality on shareable contributions. As a 
consequence, hypotheses are generated by participants in a 
crowd, in an environment enhanced by computers, and not 
solely performed by machines. 
                                                
14 There are notable exceptions to the belief that discovery can be algorithmic. 
“Karl Popper insists there is no recipe for coming up with interesting 
conjectures” (Godfrey-Smith 2003) 
C Prediction 
The third step of the proof pipeline relates to prediction, 
where a researcher generates anticipations of probable 
outcomes of experimentations assuming that initial 
conjectures produced in the previous step, described in 
Section B, are true.  
The mechanisms used to generate valuable, and high-
quality predictions are similar to mechanisms we use to 
anticipate and track patterns in experience [20]. These 
mechanisms are subject to the complex rules that govern the 
connection of experiences, or the rules of science itself15 [39] 
[40]. These complex rules are bound to human traits of 
creativity and experience and, as of the time of this writing, 
there are no instances of efficient implementation in machines.  
In the same manner, probable outcomes can be defined as 
different shocks of executions [21]. Shocks are by definition 
an iteration of a simulation. The results of the execution of 
individual shocks are recorded in datasets as shareable 
evidence, allowing other participants to understand the 
expectations of a model better and assess predictions against 
actual outcomes. 
D Test 
The last step of the proof pipeline is testing, where 
experiments are designed based on predictions produced 
during the Prediction step, described in Section C. Those 
experiments are performed in order to support or refute 
predictions, and the outcome of a test would either validate or 
falsify the original conjecture, or hypothesis.  
In some fields of study reliant on intensive and controlled 
testing, procedures related to experimentation are widely 
automated. Scientists can submit a description of their 
experiments online and have that description subsequently 
converted to specialized instructions and fed into robotic 
platforms to execute a battery of repeatable experiments [41] 
[29]. 
If we are to consider the assumption of standardized, 
quantifiable, and normalized results, it is important to 
introduce at this point the notion that experimentation on a 
complete method should also incorporate probabilities. In this 
case, a prediction should be expected to hold true 𝑁% of the 
time, in which case experimentation should be repeated to 
substantiate the probability 𝑁 [42]. 
On this sense, achieving unambiguous conclusions about a 
problem then becomes a numerical exercise, in which 
statistical inference16 is the process of getting to conclusions 
about a specific problem by looking at statistical 
characteristics of data, and by using probability alone [18] 
[43]. 
                                                
15 The core objective of science is to understand how experience shapes 
discovery, on the words of Moritz Schlick “what every scientist seeks (…) are 
the rules which govern the connection of experiences, and by which alone 
they can be predicted” (Mulder and van de Velde-Schlick 1979b) 
16 The term statistical inference, or alternatively quantitative inference, is 
defined in this paper as “the act of passing from statistical sample data to 
generalizations usually with calculated degrees of certainty” (Merriam-
Webster 2018). 
There is a widespread agreement that statistics depend on 
probability, but concomitantly there are disagreements as to 
what exactly is probability, and how probability is connected 
to statistics17 [44]. Over the last several decades Ronald Fisher 
[45], Harold Jeffreys [46], Jerzy Neyman [47], Leonard 
Savage [44], and many of their followers have defined several 
paradigms and have engaged in a number of debates that gave 
birth to controversies that were key to its formative properties 
[48]. A positive and possibly unintended consequence of the 
debate is the multitude of statistical tools and the rich set of 
options available to the scientific community to conduct 
quantitative inference [49] [50]. 
On this research, we acknowledge that these differences are 
essential, but we assume that even more important is to 
leverage this toolset to concentrate on relationships between 
data and model, or how representations mapping 
measurements in the real to the theoretical world are made. 
This shift in paradigm, in which statistical models take a back 
seat to the understanding of the relationships between data and 
methods to infer conclusions, is called statistical pragmatism 
[49]. In statistical pragmatism numerical methods are seen as 
an eclectic practice, emphasizing mechanisms by which 
observed data is connected to statistical procedures, as 
described in Figure 2 [49]. 
  
Figure 2. Pragmatic Statistics and the Mapping Between Data and 
Methods 
Pragmatic statistics are defined through abstract mathematics constructs used 
to quantify and explain observable phenomena [49]. 
In essence, pragmatic statistics is a vehicle to aggregate real 
data and theoretical descriptions into quantifiable results, and 
as such can be seen as a model to reach a set of conclusions 
based on real and theoretical constraints. 
                                                
17 The definition of probability is at the root of the division on the 
understanding of what is physical and evidential probability, as “it is 
unanimously agreed that statistics depends somehow on probability. But, as to 
what probability is and how it is connected with statistics, there has seldom 
been such complete disagreement and breakdown of communication since the 
Tower of Babel. Doubtless, much of the disagreement is merely 
terminological and would disappear under sufficiently sharp analysis.” [44] 
III. REQUIREMENTS FOR CROWD-BASED INVESTIGATION 
The use of crowds for resolution of problems follows one 
of two distinct approaches.  
The first approach, named “wise crowds” [51] relies on 
empirical observations [52] [53] and assumes the existence of 
some invisible, unquantifiable mechanism, somehow 
providing a certain level of knowledge to crowds, and 
therefore allowing them to make wise decisions. The “wise 
crowd” approach relies on the assumption of complete 
independence and isolation between participants of a crowd.  
The second approach, named collaborative crowds, 
assumes that knowledge is produced as a result of structured 
collaboration between participants of a crowd.   
This research subscribes to the second approach, 
collaborative crowds, where large-scale collaboration occurs 
by the existence of particular requirements of collaboration, as 
a natural evolutionary response to the environment in which 
investigation takes place.  
The use of crowds as agents of investigation requires an 
organization of considerable number of individuals, in 
different roles and at different levels of technical 
understanding, to continually collaborate for the resolution of 
complex problems.  However, as we can readily ascertain by 
observation, collaboration does not come out of thin air. We 
need something to drive effective collaboration, and in this 
section, we concentrate on explaining what “that something” 
is: the requirements for effective collaboration to take place. 
Collaboration is what builds “some sort of a collective 
brain with the people in the group playing the role of neurons” 
[54] [51] and ultimately amplifies the intelligence of a group 
of people. Collaboration is facilitated as a result of four 
requirements: expert attention, proper cultural and intellectual 
development, manufactured serendipity, and human diversity. 
• Expert Attention: Maximizing collaboration is 
primarily a problem of restructuring expert attention by 
designing the correct incentives that would encourage 
any single participant in a crowd to play the role of an 
expert at times, whenever it is required. Given the over-
specialized nature knowledge and the narrow window 
of expertize, these experts in crowds are called micro-
experts. Being able to call “the attention of the right 
expert at the right time” is critical to problem resolution 
by crowds of individuals. “Expert attention is to 
creative problem solving what water is to life: it’s the 
fundamental scarce resource” [54]. 
• Proper Cultural and Intellectual Development: 
Collaboration must rely on participants in a proper stage 
of cultural and intellectual development. In the 
upcoming Section V, we describe the historical 
evolution of the scientific process: from individual 
macro-experts to institutionalized science to the 
anticipated, next phase of a crowd-based investigation. 
As part of this evolution, we start to notice evidence of 
disruption in the current discovery process based on 
hierarchies and institutions, and the transition to a new 
phase in which discovery is driven by crowds and 
micro-experts. This disruption and transition are 
discussed in details in the upcoming Section VI. 
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• Manufactured Serendipity: Collaboration requires the 
right participant with the ideal amount of micro 
expertise to help in the resolution of a problem. This 
phenomenon called manufactured serendipity, allow for 
fortunate discoveries of possible opportunities for 
collaboration by quasi-accident. Serendipitous 
connections between individuals are known to be 
essential in any creative or investigative work. The 
thinking behind “manufactured serendipitous 
connections” [55] assumes connections between 
individuals cannot be fabricated, but the conditions by 
which they occur can be stimulated on purpose. In other 
words, “you can’t automate accidental discoveries, but 
you can manufacture the conditions in which such 
events are more likely to occur” [55]. 
• Cognitive Diversity: The last requirement calls for 
cognitive diversity. Cognitive diversity is the “extent to 
which a group of people reflects differences in 
knowledge, including abstract constructs like beliefs, 
preferences, and perspectives” [56]. Collaboration 
groups must be cognitively diverse, so to maximize 
instances of micro-expertise amongst its participants 
[57]. Putting it differently, to maximize collaboration, 
participants need a wide range of non-overlapping 
expertise. The minimum amount of shared knowledge 
must be the level that would allow participants to 
communicate effectively [51] [54].  
These requirements reflect the need for collaboration in 
investigative procedures that often are cross-disciplinary. 
Existing literature has identified by empirical methods a 
different set of requirements, but in a perspective that seems 
influenced by thinking on that specific field of study (e.g., in 
social sciences these same requirements for collaboration are 
outlined as process, understanding, utility, and knowledge 
integration [58]). As a common limitation, other instances in 
the literature lack quantitative metrics to show evidence of the 
importance of each prospective feature in collaboration. We 
call collaboration metrics the quantification of requirements 
for large-scale collaboration [21]. 
IV. DEALING WITH COMPLEXITY: COLLABORATIVE 
RESOLUTION OF COMPLEX PROBLEMS 
As described in Section I, this paper assumes that organized 
human collaboration is well suited for the investigation and 
resolution of complex problems. In reality, it would be 
impossible to infer absolute suitability of large-scale 
collaboration for the resolution of complex problems. 
Alternatively, we can enumerate results from empirical 
exercises, and their specific details, as evidence of resolution 
of complex problems by crowds. 
The first example, the Polymath Project [59] is a brainchild 
of Fields Medal winner Timothy Gowers, a mathematician at 
Cambridge University. The Polymath project started with a 
pair of simple posts on his blog. The first post inquiring on the 
possibility of the use of crowds in the resolution of complex 
mathematics problems [60], and then shortly after that a 
second post where Gowers proposed a particular problem to 
be resolved using massively collaborative investigation [61]. 
Over the next 37 days, 27 people from around the globe – 
from mathematics enthusiasts to high school math teachers, 
and other Fields Medal winner Terence Tao – wrote 800 
comments and more than 170,000 words on erratic 
movements of discovery [54] following an open path of 
investigative try-and-error. After those 37 days, Gowers 
announced that the crowd had solved not only the original 
problem but also a harder, more generic problem that had the 
initially proposed problem as a special case [62]18. 
Considering the requirements for large-scale collaboration 
introduced in Section II, the original problem was not 
proposed on the most appropriate platform for collaboration – 
basically, a sequence of textual comments on Gower’s online 
blog – and the specifics of the methods of incentive for micro-
specialists was not clear. Despite that, over the following 
months around a dozen of unresolved problems were proposed 
and resolved by a crowd of mathematics investigators, and the 
platform was moved from an online blog to a wiki [63]. 
Despite lacking an adequate computational representation for 
investigation in mathematics, the Polymath Project is a 
successful example of investigation and resolution of 
specialized, very complex problems by crowds. 
The second example is the control of predatory publishing 
in academia. Predatory publishing is a term popularized by 
Jeffrey Beall to refer to journals that charge huge fees to 
submit papers without proper peer review. Predatory 
publishing damage the scientific process by cheapening 
intellectual work and misleading scholars, especially early 
career researchers. 
Beall created the list in 2008 [64], and from 2010 to 2014 
alone the size of the list increased ten-fold, growing to include 
thousands of journals and publishers [65]. Inclusion on the list 
was based on a metric derived from a 52-point criterion that 
Beall created himself [66]. 
The list was controversial, mostly due to Beall’s biases and 
previous positions against the open-access movement he 
described as “anti-corporatist, oppressive and negative” [67], 
or strong statements in the lines of “predatory publishing 
damages science more than anything else” [68]. Despite the 
controversy, evidence points to the fact that Beall’s list 
highlighted recognized problems in academia, and set to 
worsen [65] [69]. Other studies point to the additional fact that 
the issue is strongly regional, and expected to worsen even 
further, as scientific research turns into a global endeavor [70] 
[71] [65]. 
On January 15th of 2017, Beall took his site and the list 
down, due to “threats and politics” [72]. 
Private initiatives swiftly took on to seize the opportunity 
and fill the void [73] through centrally managed “black” and 
“white” lists. As it is usually the case with centrally managed 
initiatives, it ignores “local knowledge”19 [74] and fails to 
address the causes of the negative phenomena20. 
                                                
18 The published author of the paper “D. H. J. Polymath” is a reference to the 
proposed problem, a new proof of the Density Hales-Jewett theorem, and to 
the crowd that took part in the resolution during the Polymath project 
19 The “local knowledge problem” in economics is often used to explain why 
the central control of distributed resources (including centrally planned 
economies) does not work [74] 
20 Even if unintended, there is symbiotic relationship in place - the very 
existence of a centrally managed, subscription based list is justified by the 
At that point, a community-based initiative, called “Stop 
Predatory Journals”, ran by an anonymous community, took 
on the maintenance of the original list and extended it. The 
initiative mostly gathers contributions made through a simple 
configuration management platform and keeps a publicly 
available list of predatory journals, predatory publishers, 
hijacked journals21, and misleading or fake metrics. 
Despite a positive impact, this community-based initiative 
is still open to criticism, but more objectively, a crowd-based 
initiative has to look primarily at market incentives in large 
scale. In this sense, predatory publishing can be seen as a 
market-oriented, rational response to two factors:  
• A poor system of incentives currently in place in 
academia [75]; 
• Bad funding models. There should be more than ‘author 
pays’ or ‘reader pays’ models.  The actual cost of 
publication is a fraction of what used to be when these 
systems were designed. Additionally, other financial 
costs like peer review are very relative in an 
environment that relies on a system of incentives for 
virtual collaboration [76]. 
In closing, the current status of crowd-based surveillance of 
predatory journals is positive but fail to address the root 
causes of the phenomena. The overall solution lacks adequate 
computational representation for academic content and 
aligned system incentives for collaboration, considering the 
requirements for large-scale collaboration introduced in 
Section II. 
In general, empirical evidence shows that collaborative 
crowds are more appropriate for the resolution of complex 
problems than conventional methods. Current research, 
however, is not able to pinpoint the exact reasons, or 
characteristics, of problems that would be more suitable for 
resolution by collaborative crowds [77] [78]. With a few 
exceptions, current literature lacks a quantitative analysis of 
the suitability of crowds for the resolution of complex 
problems [79]. 
V. FROM POLYMATHS TO CROWDS: A HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
It should come without surprise to most people that the 
ability to build objective knowledge through a scientific 
method is what drove humans out of caves and shot our race 
towards the stars. As we have previously explained in Section 
I, the scientific method can be seen as a cumulative process in 
a sense that, over time, we build new knowledge based on 
previous knowledge considered to be true. Truth, or at least 
what we perceive to be true, is not constant [21]. Given our 
history of understanding of the world around us, previous 
knowledge will almost certainly be ruled as false at some time 
in the future. On this erratic pathway a “tapestry” of “knowns” 
slowly evolves to take the infinite space of “unknowns” based 
on ever-changing knowledge foundations [80].  
                                                                                  
existence of the damaging practice - that serves as a reverse incentive to 
ending the practice of predatory publishing altogether. 
21 A hijacked journal is a journal that had either their websites or branding co-
opted by a predatory journal or publisher. 
This dynamic and seemly chaotic method of acquiring an 
understanding of the world around us has been happening for 
as long as our ancestors started to grasp with inquiries and 
guesses about cause and effect of observable phenomena. 
Even if it was unintended, and we were not entirely aware of 
its exact mechanisms, this organic adaptation has been 
happening, constantly. It is so ingenious and so ancient that it 
has been organically adjusting itself to an ever-changing 
knowledge base, resources, and culture available at different 
points in history and time.  
This adjustment occurs in evolutionary stages in response 
to available technology, the individual performing the 
scientific investigation, drivers, collaboration, creativity, and 
control in three distinct phases, as described in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Phases of Collaborative Scientific Investigation 
Characteristics of the evolution of collaborative scientific investigation from 
macro-experts, to institutions, and to crowds, depending on five factors: the 
individual performing the investigation, drivers, collaboration, creativity, and 
control 
This chart summarizes each of the phases according to the 
individual performing the research, topology, drivers, 
collaboration, creativity, and control. The individual 
performing the investigation evolved from macro-experts, or 
“natural philosophers”, to groups arranged hierarchically 
organized in institutions, to an upcoming phase in which 
micro-experts are arranged in mesh-like crowds, subject to the 
requirements listed in Section II. Each of the topologies 
represents the communication paths between participants in 
each phase. The drivers for discovery, or the entity in charge 
of conducting the investigation and inquiry, in each phase, are 
macro-experts, institutions, and crowds of micro-experts. 
Collaboration occurs in each of the phases by chance, central 
planning, and by serendipitous design, as explained previously 
in Section III. Creativity in each phase is associated with the 
individual performing the investigation. Finally, control is 
either trait depending on the macro-expert, strong, or weak, 
depending on the topology in place, respectively hub-spoke, 
tree, or mesh. 
The first phase of scientific investigation relied uniquely on 
“natural philosophers”, bright individuals who were able to 
drive discovery based on their personal traits and occasional 
interaction with other “natural philosophers”.  
During this first phase, the domain of investigation was 
related to natural observations and research conducted by 
individuals almost in isolation. Given the relative simplicity of 
subjects under study, a few very bright individuals could still 
build on previous knowledge with little or no interaction with 
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other individuals.  The collaboration was done on an ad hoc 
basis, and opportunities for interaction were left to chance and 
rare social exchanges. The proximity with domains of study 
would allow for self-funding, and the management of 
resources is de-centralized and done in almost complete 
isolation.  Ultimately, the expertise held by any single 
individual would determine the effectiveness of one’s research 
– this is the golden age of polymaths or macro-experts. 
Even with all of these intrinsic limitations, objective 
learning occurred, and the accumulation of knowledge led to 
increased complexity and a higher demand for resources to 
record, store and share knowledge. The ever-increasing body 
of knowledge demanded a more significant interaction with 
other researchers that would not necessarily share the 
immediate surroundings where research was taking place. 
Large institutions came along to fulfill the demand and 
manage the vast amount of resources needed for more 
complex methods, and more information. 
That triggered to the second phase, in which institutions 
took over the task of organization of participants and the 
management of resources required for investigation and 
collaboration. As more and more resources were needed as 
multidisciplinary subjects increased in complexity, this second 
wave, the phase of institutionalized science, came to life.  
In this second phase, participants were organized in 
hierarchical institutions across diverse kinds of institutions, 
interested in or dependent on scientific advancement: 
academia, governments, or private corporations. Most 
scientific procedures evolved to match the hierarchical 
organization of these institutions, and so the production of 
objective knowledge followed.  
VI. DISRUPTION AND BREAKTHROUGH 
As we move along through the second historical phase, 
institutionalized science started to shape research methods to 
fit into a more cumbersome, hierarchical communication, 
relying on larger, less efficient group sizes. Large institutions 
also brought along the unintended consequence of heavy top-
down hierarchical communication and stronger controls. The 
immediate consequence overall was that the complexity of 
research domains started to increase exponentially.  
This increased complexity has been producing two major 
changing forces that are shaping the resurgence of a next 
historical phase: 
• Multidisciplinary collaboration: multidisciplinary 
collaboration became mandatory. We cannot perform an 
objective investigation, on any field, without an 
understanding of orthogonal fields of knowledge. 
Unlike the first phase, no single participant, regardless 
of how bright, detains enough expertise to provide a full, 
overreaching solution to a modern-day problem. The 
natural limitation of individual participants of the 
scientific process in dealing with an ever-growing 
knowledge body marks the beginning of the demise of 
the age of macro-experts. 
• Complexity requires control: technology is an 
amplifier of features present in any environment, 
regardless of how we perceive the results of these 
features as positive or negative. This amplifying side 
effect of technology is observable everywhere: in 
politics, personal and business relationships, financial 
markets, and especially in our topic of interest: 
scientific procedures applied to economics. Technology 
is getting to a level of complexity and sophistication 
that its scientific use without control plays a role of a 
double-edged sword: it can cause more harm to the 
development of objective knowledge than good. One 
should expect the same scientific method that brought 
significant technological advancements would naturally 
improve the tools available for investigation, 
specifically computational tools. It did so to a certain 
extent. It is true we have advanced technology and 
methods available in the scientific investigation, but it is 
also true that we have abundant evidence of misuse of 
computational resources and methods in the scientific 
investigation leading to wrong or corrupt data and as a 
consequence defective research. 
These two forces are bringing several disruptive 
manifestations as signs of an upcoming wave of 
transformation. These manifestations, listed over the next 
paragraphs, are evidence that this second historical phase of 
the scientific investigation is presenting signs of inadequacy 
with current status of technology, historical, and cultural 
developments: 
• Misaligned Academic Incentives: despite an organized 
and commendable effort by scientific institutions to 
contain this harmful practice, evidence shows that 
current academic incentives are fostering a culture of 
fraud. Based on pools and questionnaires, research finds 
an astonishing number of scientists engaging in a range 
of behaviors extending far beyond falsification, 
fabrication, and plagiarism [81]. The issue is so 
prevalent that quantitative models can reliably predict 
and estimate the number of articles that should be 
retracted over time [82]. 
• Hierarchies Stifles Creativity: scientific research is 
mostly driven by creativity. As explained earlier in this 
section, in the current phase of scientific investigation, 
work is often performed in hierarchical structures. 
While hierarchies work reasonably well for control and 
decisions, there is evidence that hierarchies are 
detrimental to creativity [83] [84]. There is also 
evidence that while hierarchical institutions usually 
verbally request for innovation, their top-down 
structures unintentionally reject them [85] [86] [87]. 
The ideal structure to foster creativity is closer to a 
peer-to-peer association, the one presented by human 
crowds, than a top-down hierarchical structure [88]. 
• Human Limitation on Information Processing: there 
are hard limitations on how much information humans 
can process. The limitation on how much information 
we can consume and understand also limits the 
throughput of quality research scientists can produce, 
review and reproduce [89]. There is evidence that 
scientists have already reached a plateau on how much 
information they can efficiently absorb, handle, and 
produce [90]. 
• Unavailability of Quality Academic Content: major 
journals have recently placed restrictions on mining and 
use of scientific data in large scale [38]. Similar 
limitations apply to the refusal of providing details on 
landmark research findings for “reasons of 
confidentiality” [91] [92] [93]. These restrictions 
undermine both the automation of hypothesis generation 
reliant on vast amounts of quality data and crowd 
collaboration of micro-experts dependent on access to 
peer-reviewed, quality academic content.  
• Lack of Means to Record and Share Reliable Data: 
lack of appropriate means to record and share reliable 
data has been indicated as one of the limiting factors in 
modern investigation procedures. An additional limiting 
factor is the lack of a central authority to validate 
observations and a central repository of evidence-based 
knowledge [94]. Other evidence in the field of 
economics describe examples of global economic 
policies defined based on flawed data stored in plain 
excel spreadsheets [95] [96] [97].  
• Science Hacking: evidence collected in a correlated 
field show a considerable rate of complex biotech 
experiments published in prominent journals, heavily 
reliant on advanced computational resources, just 
cannot be appropriately reproduced [98]. Additionally, 
evidence shows that reproducibility is negatively 
correlated with the relative computational complexity of 
the experiment. In the field of economics, in particular, 
we have similar evidence [99] measuring that only 61% 
of the articles in a major journal of economics can be 
successfully reproduced.  Similar results have been 
found in psychology, in which only 38% of the studies 
can be successfully reproduced [100], or biotechnology 
where only 6 out of 53 “landmark cancer studies”, i.e., 
11%, could be properly reproduced [93]. Quantitative 
metrics also show examples of “statistics used wrong”, 
proliferating the belief that p-values alone can 
determine findings to the true when in reality they are 
false [101] [102].  
Modern science and the associated scientific method have 
taken a critical role in human societies. We have learned to 
blindly trust lives and outcomes of global reaching economic 
policies to findings that should be shielded from scrutiny by 
merely labeling them ‘scientific’. If these manifestations listed 
above sound alarmist, the feeling is rooted in plausible reasons. 
Now, here comes time for the third phase of collaborative 
scientific investigation based on multidisciplinary, diverse 
collaboration in large-scale through crowds. The use of a 
crowd-based investigation to serve as an attenuator of the 
changing forces disrupting institutionalized science.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
Increased complexity is imposing on researchers a 
mandatory multidisciplinary thinking and the use of advanced 
computational technology that is too advanced for most 
people, even scientists, to properly use and understand. The 
consequence, a disproportional amount of scientific results 
cannot be reproduced. 
To counteract this deviation, we have to act on two fronts: 
first, how to make macro-experts collaborate properly, and 
second by controlling evidence of computational artifacts of 
any kind – e.g., data, models, plots – so they can be 
adequately understood, investigated, traced and replicated. 
This paper relates to the use of technology for improvement 
of methods of investigation on these two fronts: proper 
collaboration and computational controls. These topics cover a 
broad variety of related academic work, defined by two ends 
of a spectrum, as shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Comparable Research in Methods of Scientific Investigation 
The spectrum defining the topic of improved methods of scientific 
investigation covers a broad range. On the right end of the spectrum are 
methods that rely on the full automation of methods of investigation. On the 
opposite end, methods relying on “wise crowds”. This research, proposing the 
use of specific enablers of a crowd-based investigation, sits somewhere in-
between the two opposing ends. 
One end of the spectrum is defined by research that intends 
the full automation of the process of investigation. This 
approach relates to the assignment of computers to execute 
tasks that are usually performed by scientists. Some of those 
tasks are associated with the registration of observations [29], 
automated hypothesis generation [32] and contextual gaps 
[33], and automated testing based on robotics [41]. Fully 
automated research is not feasible given current technology, as 
previously discussed in the definition of the proof pipeline, in 
Section II. Research on fully automated methods of 
investigation usually brings the same consequences and 
criticisms associated with data-driven research [103], in which 
correlations of data are detected first, and only then, 
hypotheses are produced. 
On the other end of the spectrum are solutions that rely on 
the existence of “wise-crowds”, based on empirical evidence 
collected over the years [51] [52] [53]. The wise-crowds 
approach assumes the existence of some invisible, 
unquantifiable mechanism that makes crowds wise, and relies 
on the assumption of complete independence and 
decentralization. Paradoxically, the assumption of 
independence would diminish the value of structured 
collaboration in crowd investigation. Evidence on the 
existence of some mechanism enabling wise-crowds to occur 
is often empirical [104] and the subject of some criticism 
[105]. 
This research sits somewhere in the middle of this spectrum. 
We advocate the use of a crowd-based investigation through 
methods of proof, large-scale collaboration, and 
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computational controls. This research emphasizes the use of 
computers for mechanical and repetitive tasks, like the 
orchestration of scientific interaction in crowds and the record 
of scientific evidence as contributions, as previously described 
in Section II. Additionally, this research also advocates for the 
importance of intangible human factors related to experience 
and creative thinking in science, and a hypothesis-driven 
process of discovery. 
This next generation investigative approach is an organic 
evolution of how scientific participants have been interacting 
given resources available at the time. From polymaths, to a 
centralized institutionalized science, to an upcoming form of 
crowd-based, distributed science. This paper advocates 
leveraging large-scale collaboration as a method of self-
organization for investigation in complex fields of knowledge. 
We expect this change to be disruptive and to be far from 
contained in academia only. The effects of the crowd 
automation in the acquisition of objective knowledge will be 
reflected in human interactions on all levels, and on a global 
scale. 
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